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Managing for Legitimacy:  
Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context 
 
Abstract 
Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to 
bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how 
bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive 
governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that 
this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired 
by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in 
particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. 
This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s 
parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the 
executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) 
legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different 
constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing 
legitimacy. 
 
Keywords: Hong Kong, Ireland, Agency, Constitution, Legitimacy, Administrative 
Development 
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Practitioners’ points 
• Public managers should recognize how importantly the “deep context” of 
constitutional setting underpins administrative affairs and their day-to-day 
management decisions. 
• Comparing how agencies are governaned internationally helps public managers 
realize the assumptions and implications in their work that may not be apparent 
immediately from a national perspective.  
• To reformers of public administration around the world, the study brings to their 
attention the influence of a government’s embedded legitimizing principles. 
Considerable caution must be exercised when trying to introduce some international 
“best practices”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
How are executive agencies managed? What explains the use of various agency governance 
mechanisms? The “structural choice” theories of Moe (1990) and Huber and Shipan (2002) 
focus on the delegation to independent agencies and explain it as the result of stratagems 
deployed in legislative politics. Faced with uncertainty about the outcomes of inter-party 
competition, the ruling coalition of interests represented by the majority party will seek to 
reassure its supporters through granting independence to agencies. This ensures that the 
resources and power given to the agencies, and thus their interests, will be preserved, even in 
the future when an opposition party is in control. In polities where legislative majorities are 
uncertain and multiple veto points exist, reversal of the delegation is particularly unlikely to 
occur. Huber and Shipan (2002) argue that the greater the decisional capacity of the 
legislature (for example, unicameral parliaments and majoritarian party systems) and the 
higher the level of policy conflict, the less discretion will be delegated to administrative 
agencies. These theoretical approaches describe agency autonomy in terms of the operating 
rules and practices set in place by the originating statutes and attempt to explain it in terms of 
the politics that shape the drafting and adoption of legislation (see also Koppell 2003).  
However, the operationalization of rules and practices of delegation in the ongoing agency 
management process cannot be adequately described or explained by what is in the statute or 
what is negotiated in the drafting stage. Agencies set out on their own institutional 
trajectories, becoming political actors in their own right and carving out varying degrees of 
bureaucratic autonomy over time (Carpenter 2001). Delegation is generally accompanied by 
oversight, and the delegate can be subject to multiple influences and pressures from the 
delegating authority. While “independence” may be mandated by legislation, agency 
governance mechanisms concerned with relations between an agency and its supervising or 
monitoring bodies, not to mention its stakeholders, will dictate the extent of de facto 
autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2004).  
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These mechanisms are in part the product of technical choices about different tools and 
instruments—requirements for external authorization of key appointments; monitoring of 
outputs and outcomes by both executive and legislative organs; rewards for “good 
performance”; and so on. But just as there is a politics of structural choice shaped by 
underlying legislative dynamics, so too can the choice of these mechanisms be shaped by 
institutional norms and practices embedded in underlying constitutional and administrative 
structures, and by the political stratagems that these structures permit and encourage. 
This “path dependency” argument has been well developed in political science (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004). The nature of politics, argued Pierson (2004), 
often reinforces past decisions and shapes current choices. The electoral bases cultivated, the 
political platforms campaigned, the policy coalitions built, the personnel and structural 
choices committed in past negotiations—all these features of political life create positive 
feedback that contributes to the dynamic of path dependency. Recent literature on public 
management reform builds on this argument. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) coined the term 
“many houses” to emphasize the importance of pre-existing politico-administrative regimes 
(for example, features in the constitution, the nature of the central executive government, the 
relationship between the ministers and the mandarins, the dominant administrative culture) 
when seeking to reform bureaucracies. Christensen and Lægreid (2001, 129–30) propose a 
“transformative” approach to understanding the process of administrative development, 
whereby the actions of key decision-makers are curtailed by wider contextual influences such 
as the technical and institutional environment, existing cultural processes, and formal 
structures.  
In this article, we build on these works by exploring in some detail the relationship between 
the underlying type of constitution and the variety in assigned autonomies and modes of 
control in bureaucratic organizations. Our analysis focuses on the impact of constitutional 
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differences on the management of government agencies in two jurisdictions: Hong Kong and 
Ireland. While both share many traditions inherited from the United Kingdom, they differ in 
terms of their primary constitutional regime type.  
Ireland achieved self-rule as a parliamentary representative democracy within the British 
Commonwealth shortly after World War I, before becoming a republic in 1949. It has always 
used a cabinet form of government, with the executive formally appointed by the lower 
house. In contrast, the political executive in Hong Kong has never been appointed by a 
popular assembly but instead by first the British colonial government and then, after 1997, by 
the Chinese government. We propose that this basic difference in constitutional regime 
(parliamentary democracy versus non-elected political executive) has determined in large 
part the character and form of agency governance in both jurisdictions. 
Our research questions are as follows: Are there any significant differences in the assignment 
of agency autonomies and in the use of various agency control measures between Hong Kong 
and Ireland? Might these differences be explained by the dominant underlying mechanisms 
of acquiring and sustaining legitimacy, as stipulated by the constitutions of the two polities? 
 
Modes of Legitimization 
The Westminster model has been aptly described as a case of “input democracy,” namely a 
system in which the chain of democratic control runs from the citizenry, by way of elections 
and the national legislature, through the political executive and thence to the “end products” 
delivered by the bureaucracy (Goodin 2004; Peters 2010, 2011). Input democracy posits ex 
ante control of the policy process and public administration, accompanied by supervision and 
monitoring of outputs by elected representatives. In the “output democracy” model, in the 
absence (or severe weakening) of such democratic institutions on the input side, direct forms 
of control exist between the political/bureaucratic executive and the citizenry. Fritz Scharpf 
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(1999) used the phrase “output democracy” to describe the nascent accountability 
mechanisms of the European Union. 
A useful and parallel distinction in this context is between “process legitimacy” and 
“performance legitimacy” (Pierre et al. 2011). In the former, a decision is legitimate if it 
follows the correct procedures for democratic input, while in the latter it is legitimate if it 
achieves a result that is to the citizens’ satisfaction. Zhao (2009) argues that the contemporary 
political tactics of the ruling Communist Party reflects this notion of performance legitimacy: 
The “mandate of heaven,” a legitimacy claim by dynastic rulers in the Chinese state tradition, 
is to be earned through virtuous conduct and benevolent rule.  
Some scholars argue further that the quality of output is more significant in conferring 
legitimacy on a political system than the quality of democratic input, as observed from the 
modes of legitimization adopted by many governments across the world (Rothstein 2009). 
Peters (2010) and Christensen and Lægreid (2011) identify a recent tendency for Western 
democracies to adopt forms of legitimization that reflect output rather than input models. The 
roots of these changes are described in long-term shifts in the character of Western 
democratic political institutions: the decline of party membership, the growth in the power of 
bureaucracies and special interests, and the shift in the locus of power away from the formal 
governing institutions of the nation state to local, national and transnational governance 
networks. Moreover, the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) may be associated 
with this trend, where the emphasis is on results management rather than input controls of 
spending, hiring and other administrative processes; the introduction of citizen participation 
to public-service delivery units (citizens’ charters, “one-stop-shops,” and so on); and the 
move from direct ministerial department provision of services to more agency-based modes, 
including outsourcing to service providers who might be in competition with each other 
(Kamensky 1996; Thompson 2000; Christensen and Laegried 2010). 
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Both recent “agencification” and earlier waves of independent agency creation (Koppell 
2003; Pollitt et al. 2004) relied heavily on logics of functional effectiveness and output 
performance (directly contrasted with logics of input control). Agencies were separated from 
generalized ministerial control over resource inputs and administrative processes. These 
developments have blurred the direct and unified accountability mechanisms of ministerial 
control, replacing them with multiple and more complex forms of mutual and direct 
accountability (including market accountability) at the point of production and delivery of 
services. 
The observation that traditional input democracies are becoming more “output” oriented 
through the adoption of NPM suggests that the very existence of NPM may itself be a 
contributing factor. However, from the accounts given by Peters (2011) and others, NPM 
seems to be a feature of underlying political shifts such as changes in electoral politics and 
party systems. The management mechanisms favored in NPM models find a receptive 
audience in governments whose political tactics increasingly seek output rather than input 
legitimacy. That is to say, the extent to which various input- and output-based agency 
governance mechanisms reflects the constraints and opportunities of the political and 
constitutional structures in which executive governments are embedded. Reform waves such 
as NPM bring tools and techniques on the output side to international prominence, but uptake 
and implementation are strongly informed by these underlying political features, or changes 
in them.  
 
Hong Kong and Ireland: Similarities and Differences 
As former British colonies, both Ireland and Hong Kong have inherited the 
Westminster/Whitehall tradition, a merit-based, politically neutral civil service, organized 
into ministerial departments, directed and overseen by the political executive (Halligan 2010, 
  
8 
133–4). Common-law principles of legality and the equality of citizens and governments 
before the law were implanted in both jurisdictions and survive to the present day. Both 
jurisdictions have also gone through similar processes historically when they chose to set up 
statutory bodies and boards, including independent regulatory agencies. And both 
jurisdictions have been influenced to varying degrees by recent waves of reforms, including 
agencification, performance management and outsourcing. However, the two jurisdictions 
differ significantly in their constitutional setup and corresponding institutional arrangements.  
The most basic difference is that Ireland’s political leaders are elected and depend on a 
majority in the elected parliament to govern but Hong Kong’s political executive is 
appointed—formerly by the colonial government in the UK, and now appointed by the 
Chinese government following a “small circle” vote by some 1,000 Hong Kong citizens. A 
semi-elected legislature in Hong Kong mimicked some of the supervisory and accountability 
regimes of the British parliament (such as a public accounts committee), but, even as the 
Legislative Council’s franchise was increasingly liberalized in the years approaching the 
handover in 1997, this body played no role in constituting the government of the day. (See 
Table 1 for some background information on both jurisdictions.) 
As a legacy of its long history as a British colony before the recession to China in 1997, 
Hong Kong is described as an “administrative state” (Harris 1978; Painter 2005). For most of 
its existence it has been governed by bureaucrats under the control of a small appointed 
secretariat led by a chief executive (formerly the governor). The main features of this unitary, 
“executive-led” colonial system persisted into the post-handover period. Societal elites—the 
professions, business groups, and representatives of organized labor and other social 
groupings—were recruited to assist the political executive through various consultative or 
advisory mechanisms. A civil-service examination selected the generalist elite administrative 
class of the career civil service (from which the senior governing ranks were ultimately 
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drawn). Essentially, Hong Kong was governed by a small and closed group of very well 
remunerated and generally competent administrative officers, while societal demands and 
views about the government were co-opted, or “administratively absorbed,” into its large 
number of advisory bodies (King 1975; Yee 2006). 
The ministerial body of government secretariat and policy bureaux is chiefly responsible for 
major political and policy decision-making and coordination. Beneath this, a variety of 
government agencies have evolved, somewhat haphazardly, to deal with particular 
administrative matters. Bureaucratic agencies in Hong Kong, whether government 
departments, non-departmental or related bodies (for example, statutory bodies), were 
required to develop close contacts with their societal stakeholders, as a result of which they 
often possessed important information about the preferences of these stakeholders (Lam 
2005). As a result, they became increasingly indispensable for the delivery of quality services 
and the formation of relevant government policies. 
To maintain public support, Hong Kong governments depend in large part on the 
effectiveness of public administration (quality of services, sustained economic growth, 
absence of corruption, etc.) and rather less on the limited mechanisms that provide citizens 
with the power to participate effectively in political life (Lo 2001). Their heavy reliance on 
performance for legitimacy may be demonstrated by the “governing crisis” (So and Chan 
2002; Lo 2001) in the first decade after the handover. Tens of thousands of citizens, triggered 
by the proposed Anti-subversion Bill, protested against the government amid governing 
failures such as the plummeting of housing prices after the Asian financial crisis and the 
incompetent handling of the SARS epidemic. Eventually, the first chief executive in the post-
colonial era stepped down. 
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a competitive political-party system. Political 
executives result from parliamentary majorities. The Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924 
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formalized the use of government departments, staffed by civil servants and controlled 
directly by ministers, as the core structure of the administrative system. This Act created the 
legal concept of the minister as a “corporation sole.” It determined that all actions of the 
department under the minister’s control would be undertaken in his or her name: In effect, 
ministers and their departments are one and the same. This arrangement remains the fulcrum 
of parliamentary oversight of the bureaucracy. 
The departmental or “established” civil service is the core of the wider public bureaucracy, 
charged principally with policy formulation and the implementation of the decisions of the 
political executive. It perpetuated the Whitehall model of political-administrative 
organization and retained the common-law legal system. Recruitment is open and 
meritocratic, and, until recently, entry to the middle to senior levels was restricted to serving 
bureaucrats only. The system emphasizes generalist skills, with most civil-service careers 
characterized by movement between different policy areas. Similar to many democratic 
regimes, Ireland seeks to ensure input or process legitimacy in its government operations. 
In terms of bureaucratic development, government in Hong Kong was transformed with rapid 
social and economic development from the end of World War II on. The arrival of refugees 
from China created new demands for basic welfare and security. The administration 
expanded its role into the provision of public housing, education and health services. Rapid 
urban development required public investment in infrastructure, leading to new professional 
and administrative capabilities within the public sector and a growth in the size of 
government. There was a corresponding rapid growth in the number of government bodies of 
various types. Over 60 percent of existing bodies were created after 1980 (Painter 2012, 345–
7), and the number of public servants grew as a result: Between 1970 and 1990, the civil 
service grew from approximately 95,000 employees to close to 200,000 (Scott 2005, 67–68). 
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The proliferation of non-departmental bodies in the past thirty years is not unique to Hong 
Kong. Though the Irish civil service continues to be central to policy development and 
implementation, an ever-growing number of “state agencies” play an increasingly important 
role. This increase accelerated after 1990, in tandem with a period of rapid economic growth. 
These bodies, while all formally under the control of a minister and his or her department, are 
often conferred with considerable policy autonomy in light of the requirement for 
independence in decision-making and regulation. 
The common-law administrative system has allowed for the emergence of a great variety of 
organizational forms and governance arrangements within the Irish public service. This 
organizational “zoo” reflects political priorities, attempts to separate the roles of “purchaser” 
from “provider,” as well as pressures from the European Union (MacCarthaigh 2012). Most, 
but not all, of the agencies have also had some form of governing authority or board, usually 
made up of stakeholder appointees but with considerable room for ministerial patronage also. 
 
The Influence of NPM 
Despite the differences in their constitutional setup, both Hong Kong and Ireland have, since 
the 1980s, looked approvingly on NPM ideas as the source of administrative reforms. In the 
pre-handover era, the colonial government in Hong Kong was keen to demonstrate its efforts 
to safeguard the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, calling on “international 
best practice” in the process (Cheung 1996). From the 1990s on, Hong Kong adopted a 
number of decentralizing measures to “let the managers manage.” Outsourcing was already a 
familiar device in Hong Kong’s aggressively free market economy, becoming increasingly 
popular from the 1990s for the provision of a widening range of government services. 
Accompanying the various decentralization measures, a wave of initiatives with NPM-
sounding labels were introduced: performance pledges, “managing for performance,” 
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performance reviews, “target based management,” and so on. Tight input controls were 
relaxed (especially over personnel management), and they were replaced with more rigorous 
scrutiny of operating plans and results. In the mid-1990s, “framework agreements” were 
introduced, which required secretaries to draw up annual statements of policy and strategy, 
and department heads to create departmental operating plans, to be approved by the 
secretaries. These included performance targets and the resources to be allocated, which were 
agreed by the secretaries and the directors (Godwin 1995). Similar agreements were also 
implemented for budget-supported non-departmental agencies. 
In Ireland, the impetus for administrative reform also gathered pace during the early 1990s, 
as the global NPM phenomenon reached Irish shores. The pressure for modernization 
emerged from within the civil service, culminating in the launch of the Strategic Management 
Initiative (SMI) in 1994. A host of reform initiatives followed over the course of the next 
decade. The SMI had its roots in corporate management and emphasized the public 
accountability of the bureaucracy as well as performance efficiency in public services. The 
idea was that the public service would be better if administrators were more like managers, 
with agreed goals and related output targets. A reform plan was developed based around six 
key themes: (1) Openness, Transparency and Accountability; (2) Quality Customer Service; 
(3) Regulatory Reform; (4) Human Resource Management; (5) Financial Management; and 
(6) Information Systems Management. Government departments began to talk about strategic 
planning and published strategy statements for the first time in 1995, though without 
sustained political interest (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2011). 
The reforms resulted in greater devolution of HRM responsibility, but they also brought 
about the introduction of Freedom of Information and the advancement of investigative and 
supervisory powers available to parliamentary committees. Some reform of the recruitment 
system has allowed greater career mobility and (limited) external appointments at senior 
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levels. Thus, some internationally common features of NPM and its discourse were evident in 
Ireland by the late 1990s. In 2008, the OECD published the results of an eighteen-month 
study of the Irish public service, concluding that, since the early 1990s, “Ireland has 
significantly advanced along a ‘New Public Management’ continuum” (OECD 2008, 18). 
On the face of it, there is no fundamental difference between the two jurisdictions, Hong 
Kong and Ireland, in their exposure to NPM reforms and their willingness to explore the 
options offered by it. Neither could be said to be notable as either pioneers or avid adopters 
of NPM, but both were eager to see what was on offer and to adapt what might suit the local 
conditions. While the language of performance and other NPM tools might have trickled 
down into agency management practices, the extent of their adoption and implementation 
was quite a different matter. It is within this context that we wish to explore our research 
questions: First, what are the differences between the two polities in terms of the degree of 
adoption and implementation of various agency management measures, and, second, whether 
such differences might be explained by the underlying mode of legitimization stipulated by 
their respective constitutions. We seek to answer these questions through a bivariate 
comparison on agency governance mechanisms between the two jurisdictions. 
 
Hypotheses, Data and Methods 
Overall, we expect that the Irish government will adopt a significantly higher level of input-
oriented management measures in governing its executive agencies when compared to Hong 
Kong (H1), and that the Hong Kong government will adopt a significantly higher level of 
output-oriented agency management measures than Ireland (H2). 
The empirical analysis draws on data collected from the two jurisdictions using the 
Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis (COBRA) survey 
instrument administered in 2003 (Ireland) and in 2007 (Hong Kong). This survey has been 
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used in over fifteen jurisdictions as part of an international research project studying the 
autonomy and control of state agencies.1 Questionnaires were sent to agency CEOs seeking 
information on the tasks, autonomy, and control of their agencies, as well as other variables 
including age, size, budgets, and legal structure. The research population consisted of 
executive agencies that fit the criteria defined in the COBRA survey guide: These executive 
bodies were structurally differentiated from other organizations and existed continuously; 
they were created by the government and were to some degree supervised by it; they 
performed a public function, possessed some autonomy in terms of decision-making, and had 
some personnel and financial resources, funded in part by the government. The response rate 
for Hong Kong was 57 percent and 44 percent for Ireland (see Table 1). 
[[Table 1 here]] 
The COBRA survey provided useful information about how agencies were managed in the 
two jurisdictions (see Appendix A). With regard to the assignment of decision-making 
autonomies, it measured agency managers’ perceived managerial autonomy in three 
categories: (1) strategic personnel management autonomy (SPA); (2) operational personnel 
management autonomy (OPA); and (3) financial management autonomy (FMA). It also 
measured the perceived operational policy autonomy (OPOA), namely whether agency 
managers were allowed to select policy instruments and target groups without the 
intervention of their supervising units. We hypothesize that despite the apparently similar 
impact of NPM in both jurisdictions, more input- or democratic control was maintained 
among Irish agencies. 
As a result of the persisting operational norms of parliamentary democracy and the mandates 
channeled indirectly through the elected leaders to executive agencies and their executives, 
we expected that a significantly lower level of (de facto) decision-making autonomy would 
be granted to Irish agencies (H1a). A similar logic applies to the extent that societal 
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stakeholders are involved to participate directly in supervising the now autonomized 
agencies. One way to achieve this is through the device of a governing board, appointments 
to which enable partisan and societal participation in agency management.2 Accordingly, we 
measured the frequency of governing boards with decision-making authority among all 
agencies, the frequency with which these boards appointed the agency head, and the method 
by which board members were appointed. Overall, we expected to observe a higher level of 
supervision through governing boards among the Irish agencies (H1b). 
In comparing the relative importance of output or performance control, we focused on 
practices that monitored output quality as well as those that managed the achievement of 
results. For quality-based practices, we measured the use of customer surveys, quality 
standards, quality management systems, and internal units that monitor quality in the agency. 
For result-based practices, we looked at the extent to which agencies reported their 
performance publicly and how they managed organizational divisions, and allocated 
resources based on results. If agency output or performance were key to attaining governing 
legitimacy, wider adoption of these management practices should be found. We thus 
expected that higher levels of quality management practices (H2a) and higher levels of result 
management practices (H2b) would be observed among Hong Kong agencies. 
Variables for the autonomy measures were aggregated from indicators similar to other 
COBRA studies (Painter and Yee 2011). Quality management practices (QMPs) and result 
management practices (RMPs) were aggregated from the above-mentioned indicators by 
simple summation. Mann–Whitney U-tests were applied to these variables given that the 
agencies belong to two categorical, independent groups, with the null hypotheses being that 
the mean ranks of these variables for Hong Kong and Ireland were identical.3 A significant 
U-statistic represented a statistically significant difference between the mean ranks, and the 
null hypothesis was rejected. For other variables concerning the existence of governing board 
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and the appointment of the agency head and members of the board, results are presented in 
simple cross-tabulated tables. 
 
Findings 
Our analysis found evidence to support H1a. Table 2 shows that the mean ranks of strategic 
and operational personnel management autonomies were significantly different (at 0.05 level) 
between the two polities, and that Ireland’s were lower than those of Hong Kong. 
Interestingly, the mean ranks of financial management autonomy and operational policy 
autonomy were not significantly different, possible reasons for which are discussed below.  
[[Table 2 here]] 
Ireland also displayed a much higher use of governing boards in managing agencies (H1b). 
Among our respondents, 68.8 percent of Irish executive agencies were governed by boards 
with decision-making authority, with the equivalent figure for Hong Kong being only 39.7 
percent (Table 3). Furthermore, Irish government ministers were less likely to appoint 
members of these governing boards unilaterally. Instead, in a significant percentage of cases 
(37.5 percent), such decisions were made after consultation with the organization and related 
interest groups. This percentage was much larger for Hong Kong’s board-governed agencies 
in which, in a great majority of cases (76 percent), board members were appointed 
unilaterally by the government (Table 4). 
[[Table 3 here]] 
[[Table 4 here]] 
Also, 46.2 percent of Irish government boards were given the power to appoint the head of 
the agency, compared with 25 percent in Hong Kong (Table 5). All these findings show 
support for H1b.4 Finally, in terms of the adoption of output quality and results management 
practices, the mean ranks of quality management practices and result management practices 
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were significantly different (at 0.05 level), with those of Hong Kong agencies significantly 
larger than those in the Irish case. These findings support our second hypothesis (H2).5 
[[Table 5 here]] 
 
Discussion 
Our results supported the hypothesis that Ireland placed more emphasis on input-based, 
democratic mechanisms in agency management whereas Hong Kong focused more on 
output-based, performance-oriented measures. In the Irish parliamentary system of 
government, there seems to be a larger demand for power-sharing over agency oversight than 
the executive-led government of Hong Kong. As shown, governing boards in Ireland played a 
major role here, allowing for better public control over the agencies. Nevertheless, the fact 
that decisions over agency operations, including the appointment of the agency head and new 
board members, are subject to board deliberation creates a degree of uncertainty for the ruling 
party. The limited assignment of various agency autonomies, particularly in terms of 
personnel management autonomy, reflects this concern. 
Despite recent trends in administrative reform and narratives of devolution, relatively tight 
input-based controls over agency operations were still observed. These controls allow the 
ruling party to ensure that its agencies will perform as expected and that they will exist 
largely as implementation bodies. In that vein, the introduction of external controls at the 
output stage received less attention, as agencies were already operating under tight ministerial 
input control and mandates negotiated between the elected government and key societal 
actors. 
In the administrative state of Hong Kong, the ruling government faces much weaker 
institutionalized disagreement and challenge, and there is less need for politically negotiated 
governance arrangements such as governing boards. Most boards in Hong Kong have 
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primarily advisory functions and little governing power. Where they do have decision-
making power, their members were often appointed by the government alone (Table 4). For 
its administration to be effective, the government relies more heavily on the experience of 
bureaucratic agencies at the point of delivery. The Hong Kong agencies in our survey were 
significantly more likely to adopt output-based quality and result management practices. The 
findings are especially interesting because both Hong Kong and Ireland have a similar body 
of civil servants consisting of mainly administrative officers and executive officers, with 
similar emphasis on competency and neutrality.  
No significant difference between the two jurisdictions was observed in terms of the 
assignment of financial management and operational policy autonomy. Input controls over 
money are still important in Hong Kong because a key priority of the colonial and early post-
colonial state was to retain the confidence and support of Hong Kong’s financial sector, 
which prizes responsible fiscal management and small government. Governments should be 
seen to be completely on top of the public finances, and the need to retain unity and 
coherence through the budget process and financial management systems is paramount.  
On the other hand, the similar level of operational policy autonomy, that is the power to 
decide on the target groups and policy instruments, could indicate either that the Irish 
government felt comfortable with letting the agency decide on these rather technical 
decisions (as tight democratic controls on the agencies’ overall policy direction and personnel 
management were already in place), or that the Hong Kong government was less eager to 
open its control over these items. Painter and Yee (2012) found that Hong Kong agencies 
claimed high levels of outside influence when they were setting organizational objectives but 
that the working relations between agencies and political executives were characterized by 
mutual cooperation and adaptation. We thus believe that the similar level of autonomy in 
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Irish agencies represents the confidence of the Irish government in its agencies over policy 
matters. Further research is warranted here. 
In line with our expectations, the constitutional logic underpinning each jurisdiction’s 
administrative arrangements also mediates the influence of international reform ideas such as 
NPM. In Ireland, agencies created in the 1990s adopted a stakeholder model of board 
appointments to provide more direct participation in the management of agencies. In these 
cases, the founding legislation stipulated that a large portion of the governing board members 
be nominated by various stakeholders and affected groups. Ministers rarely reject such 
candidates but reserve the right to appoint some of their own people to the board. That is, 
NPM-style “stakeholder democracy” was interpreted and applied on the input side. In Hong 
Kong, as discussed above, NPM quality and results management measures were favored, as 
they fit well with the dominant logic of performance control on the output side. The selective 
granting of personnel management autonomy, the use of results management, and the 
widespread adoption of customer feedback measures extended and reinforced the existing 
governing logic prevailing in Hong Kong. 
Looking forward, there have been heated debates about how Hong Kong should move toward 
a more democratic election of its Chief Executive. Against such a background, a contentious 
point of governmental reform concerns the issue of satisfying the long-time societal demand 
for high performance based on administrative competence and political neutrality, while 
accommodating the growing demand for input control, as reflected in the recent social 
movement for increased democracy. For one thing, with higher citizen participation in public 
affairs comes a higher level of scrutiny of public officials’ behavior.  
More important, both legislative and executive politics can be expected to show higher levels 
of partisanship, with the potential for new forms of stakeholder and partisan interactions in 
government decision-making, including demands for expanded forms of patronage and 
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criticisms among contesting governing elites (for example, alleged charges on each other’s 
conducts and malpractices). Competent managers and social elites who possess policy 
expertise but lack enthusiasm for bold leadership that may offend customers and clients may 
be less in demand than well-connected political loyalists who can satisfy particular sectional 
interests. Many observers fear the growth of particularistic pressures on the input side of 
public administration in Hong Kong. This tension between the politics of effectiveness and 
the politics of representativeness seems unavoidable. 
In the Irish case, the evolution of agency organization and governance has continued to be 
strongly informed by norms of democratic control of the administrative apparatus and 
particularly the accountability of the political executive for the work of agencies. The recent 
crisis in public finances beginning in 2008 has resulted in a sustained period of agency 
reform or “rationalization” in a bid to reduce numbers, but little meaningful attention has 
been given to the strategic use of agencies to achieve higher performance, as advocated by 
the OECD in 2008. While more attempts are being made to quantify agency outputs in 
relation to budgetary allocations, the dominant trend has been for the introduction of new 
HRM and financial controls from central government and a reassertion of political control 
over their work. 
Ironically, the tightening of political control has resulted in the stakeholder model of 
appointing agency boards coming under pressure, and the new administration elected in 2011 
viewed boards as confusing political signals from ministers and committed itself to 
abolishing them “where appropriate.” Attempts to encourage parliament to use agency output 
and performance statements when discussing financial allocations have met with some 
limited success, though in a context whereby the ruling coalition tightly controls the work of 
the legislature. While the pressure for NPM-style performance-based accountability will 
remain as a goal of reformers in the Irish case, the path of representative democracy will 
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continue, for better or for worse, to provide the principal avenue for the organization and role 
of state agencies. 
In summary, the findings presented here, based on a “huge comparison” (see Tilly 1984, 
144–147) between agency governance in Ireland and Hong Kong, point to the strong 
influence of the “deep context” of constitutional regime type on how agencies are managed. 
There are limitations to our data and analysis, such as the potential for self-reporting bias and 
the relatively small number of N than necessary for more sophisticated statistical analysis. 
However, our findings are consistent with the general “transformative” ideas proposed by 
Christensen and Lægreid (2001) concerning the effects of environmental forces on the 
character of internal bureaucratic development, as well as Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) 
“many houses” model of administrative reform. Our analysis contributes to the existing 
literature by demonstrating how basic constitutional differences may affect the level and type 
of management measures in agency governance. 
 
Conclusion 
The study of agency governance represents a renewed research focus on bureaucracy. It 
extends the existing literature, which explains bureaucratic autonomy through legislative 
politics, toward understanding variations in agency supervision and management and how 
they may be linked to a variety of contextual, historical and situational factors, including the 
underlying constitutional models of legitimization. Our study exemplifies this approach 
through comparing the jurisdictions of Hong Kong and Ireland, which share similar 
administrative traditions and structures but which differ in the underlying constitutional rules 
that define the basis of governing legitimacy.  
While not rejecting the potential impacts of other agency-level factors (for example, size, 
policy types, and tasks), our results support the path dependency argument in administrative 
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development. Despite NPM reform, democratic states such as Ireland that stress input 
legitimacy tend to govern agencies by way of pluralistic inputs within a clear ministerial and 
departmental hierarchy. On the other hand, administrative states such as Hong Kong, which 
rely more on output legitimacy, tend to regulate effective agency output through more 
decentralized arrangements, sector by sector. In the case of Hong Kong, key financial 
controls ensure the coherence and unity of the administration. 
The study has a number of implications for practitioners of public management. It encourages 
senior public managers to realize the degree to which the “deep context” of constitutional 
setting underpins their management decisions. Such contextual influence matters not only to 
legal scholars and political scientists but also to public managers in their day-to-day 
administrative affairs (see, for example, Feldman 2015). International comparisons such as 
this help uncover the assumptions and implications that may not be immediately apparent 
from a national perspective. To reformers of public administration around the world, it brings 
to their attention the influence of a government’s embedded legitimizing principles, which is 
particularly important for governments of developing countries who want to implement 
international “best practice” (see, for example, Serra and Stiglitz 2008). 
More cross-national comparative work could usefully develop this underexplored relationship 
between agency governance and constitutional context. While much work has been done to 
compare agency governance within similar constitutional regimes, such as European 
parliamentary democracies, the model presented here offers a means of testing and explaining 
modes of agency governance between different regimes globally. This points the way to 
advancing the international study of administrative development, and to the possibility of 
reforms in given political and constitutional contexts. 
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Table 1. Background Information of Hong Kong and Ireland 
 Hong 
Kong 
Ireland 
Surface area (sq. km)* 
 
1,100  70,280 
Population (millions)* 
 
7.242 4.613 
GNI per capita (current US$)* 
 
40,320 44,660 
Mean agency age (established with the current name) at the 
time of survey  
23.34 19.29 
Mean staff number (Full Time Equivalent on 31 March 2006 
(Hong Kong) and 30 August 2004 (Ireland)) 
3,211.74  140.545 
Sample size (as percentage of population) 63 (57 
percent) 
93 (44 
percent) 
Total population of agency 111 211 
* Data from The World Bank. Last updated 31 July 2015. 
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Table 2. Mann–Whitney U Test: Comparing the mean ranks of agency management practices 
between Hong Kong and Ireland 
Mann–Whitney U Test; 
H0: Mean ranks are identical 
Asymptotic 
significance* 
Remark 
Strategic personnel autonomy (SPA) .001* Reject H0 
Operational personnel autonomy (OPA) .001* Reject H0 
FMA .156 Retain H0 
Operational policy autonomy (OPOA) .154 Retain H0 
RMP .000* Reject H0 
QMP .000* Reject H0 
* Significant at .05 level, with all mean ranks of Hong Kong being larger. T-tests (2-tailed) 
were also performed to compare the means of these agency management practices between 
Hong Kong and Ireland. The decisions regarding the hypotheses were the same as above, 
whether equal variances were assumed. 
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Table 3. Existence of governing board with decision-making authority 
 Hong Kong Ireland 
 Frequency (percentage of 
respondents/percentage of the 
population) 
Frequency (percentage of 
respondents/percentage of the 
population) 
No 36 (57.1 / 32.4) 26 (28.0 / 12.3) 
Yes*  25 (39.7 / 22.5) 64 (68.8 / 30.3) 
Missing 2  3  
* Two-proportion z-test (pooled) is applied with H0 as equal sample proportions. The null 
hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level. 
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Table 4. Appointment of board members  
 Hong Kong Ireland 
 Frequency 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
By government secretary/minister alone* 19 (76) 31 (48.4) 
By government secretary after consultation with the 
organization and/or interest groups 
2 (8) 24 (37.5) 
Others 3 (12) 9 (14.1) 
Missing 1 (4) 0 (0) 
Total 25 64 
* Two-proportion z-test (pooled) is applied with H0 as equal sample proportions. The null 
hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level. 
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Table 5. Appointment of organizational head 
 Hong Kong Ireland 
 Frequency 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
Neither by government secretary nor governing board  7 (11.1) 12 (12.9) 
By government secretary 35 (55.6) 27 (29.0) 
By government secretary upon nomination from 
governing board 
3 (4.8) 4 (4.3) 
By governing board* 16 (25.4) 43 (46.2) 
Missing 2 (3.2) 7 (7.5) 
* Two-proportion z-test (pooled) is applied with H0 as equal sample proportions. The null 
hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level. 
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Appendix A: Measurement of variables 
Variables Measures (Exact wordings vary slightly in the two surveys. 
Answers were summed to form the composite indices on the 
left.) 
SPA 
(Alpha for HK = .865) 
(Alpha for IRL = .684)  
Respondents were asked if they possess the power to set the 
following items in their organizations (Yes = 1; No = 0): 
(1) Staff number; (2) Level of Salaries; (3) Conditions for 
promotions; (4) Staff tenure; (5) Way of evaluating personnel 
OPA 
(Alpha for HK = .827) 
(Alpha for IRL = .783) 
 
Respondents were asked to what extent they possess the 
power to do the following items in their organizations (Yes, for 
all staff = 1; Yes, for most staff = 0.66; Yes, for some staff = 
0.33; No = 0): 
(1) Increase wage of a specific employee; (2) Promote a specific 
employee; (3) Evaluate a specific employee; (4) Dismiss a single 
employee 
FMA 
(Alpha for HK = .794) 
(Alpha for IRL = .648) 
 
Respondents were asked if they possess the power to do the 
following items in their organizations (Yes = 1; Yes, with 
conditions = 0.5; No = 0): 
(1) Take loans; (2) Set charges for services or products; (3) Shift 
between the budgets for operating expenses; (4) Shift between 
the budgets of different years  
OPOA 
(Alpha for HK = .842) 
(Alpha for IR = .738) 
Respondents were asked if they have the power to decide on 
the below items (Organization takes most of the decisions = 6 
through Organization takes no decision =1): 
(1) Target group; (2) Policy instruments 
QMP 
(Alpha for HK = .603) 
(Alpha for IR = .740) 
Respondents were asked to what extent the following 
practices take place in their organizations (To larger extent = 2; 
To some extent = 1; No = 0): 
(1) Customer surveys; (2) Quality standards; (3) Quality 
management systems; (4) Internal units that monitor quality 
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RMP 
(Alpha for HK = .481) 
(Alpha for IR = .704) 
Respondents were asked to what extent the following 
practices take place in their organizations (To larger extent = 2; 
To some extent = 1; No = 0): 
(1) Public reporting of performance* (both financial and non-
financial performance); (2) Manage divisions based on results; 
(3) Allocate resource based on results 
* This items was measured by two separate questions in the 
Irish survey. The score was thus an average of the two 
answers.  
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Appendix B: Composition of governing board with decision-making authority 
Table B.1 Number of times being the majority (>50 percent) in board 
 Hong Kong Ireland 
 Frequency 
(percentage) 
Frequency 
(percentage) 
Central government and other government 
representatives. 
5 (20) 3 (4.7) 
Representatives. of stakeholders (for example, 
employee organizations, employer organizations, 
stakeholders, employees of the organization, top 
management, private shareholders) 
8 (32) 15 (23.4) 
Independent expert representatives  7 (28) 13 (20.3) 
Missing  0 (0)  8 (12.5) 
Total 25 64 
 
Table B.2 Average percentage in board representation 
 Hong Kong 
(percentage) 
Ireland 
(percentage) 
Central government and other government 
representatives 
23.3 18.8 
Representatives. of stakeholders (for example, 
employee organizations, employer organizations, 
stakeholders, employees of the organization, top 
management, private shareholders) 
 37.7 32.6  
Independent expert representatives 28.6  32.2  
Missing  0  8 
Total 25 64 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table C.1 Correlations (Hong Kong) 
 SPA OPA FMA OPOA QMP RMP  
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
2.576 
(1.941) 
2.601 
(1.086) 
1.680 
(1.029) 
9.067 
(3.172) 
5.140 
(1.807) 
4.155 
(1.348) 
Age -.036 -.160 -.196 -.042 .197 .153 
Staff number .087 .111 -.214 -.403** .167 .149 
Regulation (dummy) .097 .085 -.093 -.071 -.186 -.202 
Service Provision (dummy) -.179 -.302* -.055 -.321* .201 .131 
 
Table C.2 Correlations (Ireland) 
 SPA OPA FMA OPOA QMP RMP  
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
1.501 
(1.346) 
1.762 
(1.260) 
1.402 
(1.008) 
8.122 
(3.625) 
3.337 
(2.364) 
3.000 
(1.711) 
Age .023 -.033 .065 .016 .106 .033 
Staff number -.027 .146 .050 .079 .220* .139 
Regulation (dummy) .056 .168 -.204 .011 .118 .000 
Service Provision (dummy) -.004 -.065 .232* .016 .025 .099 
* Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table C.3 Correlations (Hong Kong and Ireland) 
 SPA OPA FMA OPOA QMP RMP  
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
1.938 
(1.691) 
2.101 
(1.259) 
1.517 
(1.023) 
8.500 
(3.471) 
4.056 
(2.328) 
3.472 
(1.668) 
Age .033 -.027 .012 .014 .078 .145 
Staff number .154 .155 -.084 -.181 .177 .195* 
Regulation (dummy) .040 .093 -.168 -.031 -.083 .003 
Service Provision (dummy) .015 -.033 .149 -.060 .197* .173* 
* Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix D. Mann–Whitney U Test: Comparing the mean ranks of agency management 
practices between Hong Kong and Ireland based on policy type and task.6 
Mann–Whitney U Test; H0: Mean ranks are identical Exact significance Remark 
Economic Affairs (17, 23)   
SPA .000* Reject H0 
OPA .060# Reject H0 
FMA .001* Reject H0 
OPOA .186 Retain H0 
RMP .040* Reject H0 
QMP .050* Reject H0 
Public Order and Safety (7, 9)   
SPA .171 Retain H0 
OPA .015* Reject H0 
FMA .586 Retain H0 
OPOA .241 Retain H0 
RMP .065# Reject H0 
QMP .014* Reject H0 
Recreational, Culture and Religion (6, 9)   
SPA .126 Retain H0 
OPA .283 Retain H0 
FMA .886 Retain H0 
OPOA .562 Retain H0 
RMP .090# Reject H0 
QMP .565 Retain H0 
General (12, 8)   
SPA .481 Retain H0 
OPA .024* Reject H0 
FMA .399 Retain H0 
OPOA .043* Reject H0 
RMP .069# Reject H0 
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QMP .019* Reject H0 
Regulation (25, 43)   
SPA .013* Reject H0 
OPA .073# Reject H0 
FMA .182 Retain H0 
OPOA .609 Retain H0 
RMP .120 Retain H0 
QMP .041* Reject H0 
Service Provision (42, 39)   
SPA .053# Reject H0 
OPA .021* Reject H0 
FMA .597 Retain H0 
OPOA .928 Retain H0 
RMP .003* Reject H0 
QMP .000* Reject H0 
* Significant at .05 level. # Significant at .10 level. 
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Appendix E. Number of respondents as a percentage of the population by policy type 
UN Classification system Number of respondents 
as a percentage of the population 
 Hong Kong Ireland 
01. General public service 50 25 
02. Defense -  0 
03. Public order and safety 87.5 36 
04. Economic affairs 50 55 
05. Environmental affairs 100 80 
06. Housing and community amenities 76.9 100 
07. Health 12.5 56 
08. Recreational, culture and religion  75 47 
09. Education 71.4 38 
10. Social protection 42.9 39 
Total 56.8 44 
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Endnotes 
1 See also http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost/survey/index.htm for details (accessed September 2, 
2015). 
2 We note that some scholars (for example, Yesilkagit and Christensen 2010) consider boards 
to be outside of the standard delegation model within parliamentary systems, whereby boards 
may compete with ministers to determine the work of agencies. 
3 We thank the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. 
4 Appendix B looks into the compositions of these governing boards. Judging from both their 
number of times being the majority and the average percentage of board representation, we 
found that neither government, stakeholders, nor independent experts was predominantly 
represented in these boards. Thus, as far as the internal discussion was concerned, governing 
boards seemed to serve mainly input-based democratic oversight purposes for both polities.  
5 To check if the significant differences are related to other factors, we analyzed the 
correlations between the corresponding variables and agency age, size (staff number), and 
their primary tasks (regulation and service provision) (Appendix C). Also, Mann–Whitney U-
tests were performed on agencies belonging to various policy tasks to see if the mean ranks 
of the variables were identical (Appendix D). Overall, the results corresponded with our 
expectations, with the exception that significant correlations (at 0.05 level) were observed 
between, in Hong Kong, service provision and OPA; in Ireland, staff number and QMP; and, 
in the combined sample, staff number and RMP, service provision and QMP as well as RMP. 
Also, we find only small difference in the category “Recreational, Culture, and Religion.” As 
acknowledged below, this study does not reject the possible influence of agency-level factors 
such as agency size, policy type, and tasks. Future research (for example, large-N and cross-
country) is recommended to identify the antecedents for the adoption of various agency 
management practices. 
6 The numbers in the blanket indicate the number of agencies belonging to that categories in 
both polities. Executive agencies were grouped largely by self-reported primary policy type 
and task. The grouping of agency policy type was based on the UN classification system (see 
Painter and Yee 2011). For accuracy, categories with larger than five organizations in each 
polity were included for comparison. Appendix E presents the number of respondents as a 
percentage of the population by the same classification. 
